Abstract-This paper describes the system architecture, design and implementation highlights for the Mars Pathfinder ,flight system scheduled to land on the surface of Mars on July 4, 1997. Mars Pathfinder is one of the new series of small, challenging missions doing signrficant science/engineering on a fast schedule and cost capped budget.
Abstract-This paper describes the system architecture, design and implementation highlights for the Mars Pathfinder ,flight system scheduled to land on the surface of Mars on July 4, 1997. Mars Pathfinder is one of the new series of small, challenging missions doing signrficant science/engineering on a fast schedule and cost capped budget.
The Mars Pathfinder spacecrafl is adtually three spacecraft: cruise stage, entry vehicle and lander. The cruise stage carries the entry and lander vehicles to Mars and is jettisoned prior to entry. The entry vehicle, including aeroshell, parachute and deceleration rockets, protects the lander during the direct entry. and reduces its velocity fiom 7.6 to 0 knds in stages during the 5 minute entry sequence. The lander's touchdown is softened by airbags which are retracted once stopped on tlhe surface. The lander then uprights itselfl opens up hlly and begins surface operations including deploying its camera and rover.
The project is 2 years into its 3 year development cycle with most flight hardware delivered and in system test. This jpaper overviews the mission design, system [l J The work described in this paper was performed at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California Instilute of Technology, under a contract with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
architecture and configuration. Descriptions of key subsystems are givlen, including the entry, descent and landing system elements. The implementation approach is discussed f?om the point of view of the new ways of doing business needed to accomplish this challenging mission within the schedule and cost constraints. The science objectives are to assess the structure of the Martian atmosphere, determine elemental composition of rocks and soil, investigate surface geology and mineralogy of rocks and acquire meteorology data at the surface. This paper is written at a point in the project where most flight hardware has been delivered and system test is going well. Adequate budget and schedule reserves appear to be available to complete the project within its original schedule and budget constraints. This paper describes the spacecraft design and implementation approach that have come together to produce one of the most exciting and demanding space missions of the last 20 years.
The night system discussed here is defined as the spacecraft without the science instruments or rover. This is the definition used during the development phase, where there are separate offices for the spacecraft, science and rover. Once delivered for integration (Dec., 1995) , science and rover become part of the night system. During the EDL phase only the carrier will be transmitted to Earth from which various events will be discerned from the Doppler signature. In addition, a amplitude modulation technique is used to signal specific events such a heat shield separation and acquisition of altimeter signal. Solid rockets start firing at <90 m from the surface and slow the descent from 65 m/s to 0. The bridle is cut at < 30 m from the surface and Pathfinder then free falls to a landing at less than 15 m/s (33 mph) vertical and up to 20 m/s (44 mph) horizontal velocity. Landing loads are limited to 6 0 g's using an air bag system designed with sufficient stroke to accommodate 1/2 m size rocks without contacting the lander. The lander bounces and rolls to a stop. After no more motion is detected the airbags are deflated by opening a vent and retracted back to the petal surfaces. The lander then rights itself using 3 actuators which open the petals of the tetrahedral lander like a flower. The petals have solar panels on their inside surfaces which power the spacecraft for surface operations. The lander configuration is shown in Figure 3 .
After uprighting and opening, the lander will first transmit stored EDL data and real time lander and rover engineering telemetry, completing a major mission objective. Under nominal conditions, the stereo imager (IMP) will then be deployed to locate the sun for determination of the lander orientation and thereby to enable high gain antenna communication directly to Earth. IMP will then use its 12 spectral channel, CCD camera to generate a panorama of the surface, image the atmosphere and support rover navigation.
It is planned to deploy the rover for the start its surface operations mission on the first day. The rover conducts surface mobility experiments, images rocks and soil and deploys the alpha-X-ray-proton spectrometer (APXS) for making elemental composition measurements of soil and rocks. The mobile rover enables direct measurements of Mars rocks to determine mineralogy which was not possible on the Viking mission. The rover carries forward and afl looking cameras for demonstrating autonomous hazard avoidance and imaging its local surroundings, soil and rocks, and the lander.
The lander primary mission is thirty sols (1 sol = 24.6 hrs). Nearly 100% of all lander and rover engineering and science objectives are achieved in the first few days of surface operations. Currently, no constraints preclude operations of the lander beyond the primary mission although lifetime is most likely limited by the battery cycle life and large thermal cycle (-40 to +40 each sol) stress on some electronic assemblies.
Radar Antennae -. - Mbyte of dynamic RAM andl interfaces to the other electronics through a 3:2-bit VME bus.
The lander electronics are contained in 20 boards integrated into a single integrated
electronics module (25x25~50 cm). Each of the boards is on a 20 by 23 cm aluminum chassis for stifhess and heat dissipation. Eight of the boards interface directly to1 the VME backplane chassis including the hardware command decoder (HCD) uplink board, the Reed-Solomon Downlink (RSDI,) board, 4Mbyte of in-flight programmable, nonvolatile EEPROM (on two cards), the power converter board (APCU), the power and pyro switching controller (PPSIF) and the camera interface board. . The REU, RSDL, HCD utilize custom ASIC's developed by the Cassini project which enabled si@cant board size reductions and increased reliability. The flight s o h a r e is an integrated product written using object oriented design principles and is written in C. The software is stored on 2 Mhyte of EEPROM along with a number of sequences and critical telemetry. A comiplete back-up version is contained on the 2nd set of EEPROM to allow for recovery from the unique fault of a reset during a soflware upload.
Mechanical Integration WW (built at WL) is composed of the cruise and lander structures which are aluminum machinings. Composite structures were considered but the complex interfaces and point loading made composites a poor trade. Very high torque rotary actuators drive the lander petals open with an output torque of greater than 1370 N-m (1000 ft-lb) to overcome gravity from any initial orientation.
The temperature control design is particularly challenging. During launch and cruise the primary problem is to maintain the lander electronics and, in particudar, the battery within flight allowables. The battery life is best maintained if it is kept within -10 to 10 C.
Once on the surface, the primary problem is to maintain the electronics above -40 C during the cold Martian night (sink temp. as cold as -120 C) without using a lot of stored energy. This requires thermally isolating the electronics within a very high performance insulation cavity. The temperature control dilemma is how to remove heat during cruise from a well insulated electronics assembly and yet reduce to almost nothing the losses at night on the surface. After studying many passive designs involving hieatpipes (variable and fixed conductance) and thermal straps, an active fluid loop heat rejection system (HRS) was baselined. This single phase, Freon 11 loop, carries >lo0 watts to a radiator on the cruise stage and is purged just prior to entry.
The Power and Pyro Switching Subsystem provides power from two 5.5 mil GaAs solar arrays (built by Applied Solar Energy Corp.), generating -250w at Mars om the cruise stage and -1140~ on the lander. The lander carries a >40 Amp-hr, high specific; energy, Ag-Zn batteq (built by BST Systems Inc.) which is a primary battery modified to be used as a secondary for at least 30 cycles of 100% discharge. The bus voltage is controlled to within 24-36 volts by a shunt regulator. Power control, distribution and pyro switching electronics (built by Loral) employ mechanical relays driven by ATM. The 'pyro relays, cables and squibs are hlly redundant, the drivers are not.
The Telecommunications Subsystem is made up of radio frequency (RF) electronics and antennae. The RF elements include: a deep space X-band transponder @ST) (built by Motorola for Cassini), a Command Detector Unit (CDU) (built by JPL), a Pathfinder developed solid state power amplifier (SSPA) delivering 13w of RF power for 57w of input power, a Pathfinder developed telemetry modulation unit ("U) built around a 111 custom ASIC mixing both analog and digital fknctions on a single chip. The antenna system consists of a low/medium gain antenna (LMGA) stack (nominally 40 bps) and a 2 axis steerable high gain (nominally 1200 bps). The LMGA stack goes through 3 staging operations to provide separate antennas for cruise, entry and surface communications. The HGA operates only on the surface of Mars.
The Propulsion Subsystem is a classic hydrazine mono-propellant system operating in blowdown mode using four titanium tanks with propellant management devices (built by PSI), eight 1 lbf thrusters (built by Oh) in 2 clusters of 4 each. These clusters are valved to provide redundancy in case of a leaky thruster. The total propellant load is 85 kg designed to deliver approximately 130 m / s of delta velocity. 
ENTRY, DESCENT AND LANDING S U B S Y S~

DESCRIPTION
Radar altimeter Airbags
Graphite epoxy aeroshell (backshell and heatshield) with thermal protection system These elements are intimately interrelated in design and hnction. For example, the airbag design is dependent on the landing velocity which is dependent on the altimeter performance and the total impulse of the RAD rockets which is in turn dependent on the parachute terminal velocity. The design of these elements is tied together by a team of systems engineers and analysts. This team has developed and exercised a master MonteCarlo simulation which predicts performance based on test correlated properties of the EDL elements and includes the uncertainties of the hardware, software and the natural environment. A separate hardware timer, which the computer updates during EDL, will control all EDL critical events if the computer should reset during entry. Although default values are set in the timer prior to entry, the W o o d of mission success is greatly increased by acquistion of the radar altimeter data. The basic sequence of EDL is depicted in Figure 5 .
The aeroshell (heatshield and backshell, built by Lockheed-Martin Aerospace) is derived fiom the Viking design and uses requalified V i i g heritage thermal protection materials. This heatshield is designed to handle heating loads of >130w/cmA2.
The on-board accelerometer senses the deceleration pulse which the computer used to calculate the parachute opening to be at a dynamic pressure of less than 800 N/mA2. The parachute (built by Pioneer Aerospace) is based on the diskgap-band V i g design with a larger band for increased stability during terminal descent. 
IMPLEMENTATION
Mars Pathfinder is one of the first of NASA's missions implemented under the "faster, better cheaper" (FBC) paradigm. The technical and programmatic challenges of this mission development are significant. The development period is 3 years and the hard cost constraint is $171M (real year $, not including launch vehicle or mission operations), of which the flight system will likely be about $13 5M. The logical comparison is to Viking which was a 6 year development which today would cost S 3 B . The fbndamental difference between Pathfinder and Viking is the approach to risk. Pathfinder must take risks that are not typical for planetary spacecraft, including a mainly single string architecture, non-class S electronic parts and limited documentation. Of course, the mission must also be successful. Ways of doing business, many that harken back 30 years, are being used that signiiicantly reduce development time and control costs while still assuring a highly reliable vehicle. These "new ways of doing business" are highlighted below in the form of lessons learned.
The excitement about the mission and the Project's commitment to "reinventing" ways of doing business attracted many of JPL's best and brightest. In spite of the long hours and hard work I heard from many people that this is the best project they had ever worked on. The success of the Mars PathBnder development to A t e proves the old adage that the right team of motivated people, when clearly given the task and resources, can do almost anything. It has rarely been smooth sailing and occasionally, old "business as L " ' attitudes and practices had to be corrected, sometimes painfully.
Hands-on management is essential for FBC projects. Project and subsystem managers were selected for their technical skills and hands-on leadership style. In depth technical understanding and knowledge of programmatic resources and design margins (e.g. mass, power, bandwidth) at all levels allowed for rapid decision making, saving time and money. Extensive trade studies were not needed to make baseline changes. Real time meetings and memos were used to make and document many decisions.
A flat organization structure and the COlocation of management, systems, m, ground data system and mission operations has led to excellent communication and rapid problem resolution. The project-level flight system management was on a first name basis with nearly every member of the team, including cognizant engineers, designers and technicians. Key decisions were able to be made quickly because the management team had a detailed understanding of status, problems, problem ramifications and could work with the doing engineers to resolve problems, either technical or programmatic.
An atmosphere of openness and honesty between the Project and the doing organizations fostered mutual trust, the essential element of teamwork. An us-versusthem mentality always hides problems, slowing down their identification and resolution.
Technical and budget problems are resolved quickly in a healthy team environment. For example, all subsystem managers knew the state of the project reserves and each other's budget. When budget cuts were needed we worked together on scope reductions and did not levy arbitrary cuts (the old everyone cut 10% approach). On the other hand, when a task needed more money they were not forced through a paidid gauntlet of justification and paperwork to get it. Usually a few minute meeting sufficed to explain the need and get the OK.
A "capabilities &en" approach to system and subsystem design was used which efsectively limited expensive requirements driven optimization. The team pushed back on "requirements" driving cost/risk/schedule and limited performance to capabilities. This approach did not significantly restrict overall mission performance, particularly in the science mission.
To a large extent documentation was need &iven and informal. Further, we placed a high reliance on individual team member's knowledge, communication skills and commitment to make sure things did not fall through cracks. For example, the only formal level3 Flight System requirements document is 77 pages long and includes both requirements and where they are to be verified (e.g., subsystem or system test). Subsystems generated level4 documents as they needed. The engineering change request (ECR) process was run by a siigle member of the S E Systems team. Total number of ECRs to date is about 15.
Baseline changes were communicated first in team meetings then documented in a memo from the Flight System Manager.
Interface control documents (ICD's, mechanical, electrical and informational) got early focus but it still was not enough to avoid expensive delays in getting H/W built. We put one person from the subsystem with the greatest stake in the results in charge of each ICD (i.e., Mechanical ICD: Mech. Sys., Electrical ICD: SIC Systems, Information ICD: AIM). On fast paced missions, the design and interface definition process has to proceed in parallel to a significant extent. A near constant cycle of progress-problemresolution-progress cuts across many subsystems in a highly integrated design like Pathfinder's. The fact that some of the most complex interfaces are with new subsystems (EDL, science) and/or are contracted tasks made the ICD definition problem all the more difficult. The ICD development tasks require strong project support at the system-level, including, assigning experienced engineers (who know what to look for and how to work detailed interface problems) who are personally responsible for making sure the hardware being built matches the ICD 's (Le., going out and directly checking that the engineers are building to the ICD ' s).
Extensive use of small, iqformal, hands-on peer reviews for all system, subsystem and assembly-level reviews worked well. Major formal reviews rarely, if ever, uncovered design or implementation problems. The peer reviews were a forcing knction to complete preliminary and detailed designs on time. The peer reviews brought in broad technical experience fi-om inside and outside the project without a lot of overhead. The Flight System had about 100 peer reviews! We also used traditional monthly management reviews with each subsystem and major contract to bring engineers, subsystem management, line management & project management together to provide a common view of progresdproblems and allow an integrated approach to problem resolution.
For sofhvare development we used modulelevel PDR's instead of rigorous top down requirements flow which let sofiare &signers work with users and increased their knowledge and ownership of the product. The use of an object oriented architecture has also worked well allowing for a clean partition of tasks. Guidance and control (G&C) analysts developed, coded and tested their algorithms and then delivered prototype code to the software team. This process worked well, was very motivating to the G & C team and got us good attitude control code very early. An experienced procurement manager, on project sta& worked with our procurement organizations to streamline the procurements and contracts process, allowing us to place contracts in record time. We used requestfor-proposal (RFP) pre-ship reviews to bring all appropriate parties together and make the package finalization a parallel, rather than serial process. By consciously working to reduce the level of detail of requirements and the number and scope of paper deliverables, we were able to reduce contract costs without any significant loss in product visibility or quality.
Early involvement and efsective teaming with industry are essential for FBC missions. Pathfinder established an excellent relationship with various contractors, many under fixed price contracts (e.g., computer, parachute, RAD rockets, power converters, solar mays, aeroshell).
The nature of an FBC development (in particular the cost caps) requires flexibility and cooperation on contracted elements. Most of our vendors were very supportive and worked with us to provide the best products for the money. Although major aerospace contractors do not tend to like fixed price contracts we probably got the most product for the money under this relationship.
Known risk are controlled in the classic way by using qualifiedparts, known materials and processes, adequate design margins and lots of testing. A largely single string planetary mission with Class B parts has not been attempted since the Mariners of the 1960's. Pathfinder's design was facilitated by a short (-8 month) mission, simple spinner during cruise and low radiation environment. We are intentionally hardware rich, employing separate WW and SnV testbeds for development, trouble shooting and mission operations planning. We intentionally started our assembly, test and launch operations (ATLO) phase early (an aggressive 20 months after project start, 18 months before launch) to assure lots of test time (planning for 1000-2000 hrs on electronics before flight). The largely single string SIC requires much less fault protection design, development and testing than other spacecraft. Pathfinder has only two to major fault protection algorithms: command loss and battery charge control.
Unpredictable risk is handled by establishing
and managing programmalic and technical reserves (e.g., mass, power memory). The initial budget reserve was >40% and initial schedule reserve in ATLO was >20 weeks, which so far have proved adequate. Mass growth has been a constant problem due primarily to the unknowns in the EDL development, particularly the airbags. The navigation team was able to improve their certainty of the entry geometry well enough to allow us to push the ballistic coefficient up to 65 kg/mA2 (Viking was 62 and used active control during entry) and enable an entry mass of up to 603 kg (up from an original limit of 436 kg). In order to maintain control over this critical resource the Flight System Manager personally managed the mass list and made dl calls on mass increase/reductions.
Any mission including the capabilities necessary to land on the surface of a planet from space carries with it higher inherent risk than a fly-by or orbiting mission. The complexities of the required hardward software and the uncertainties in the environment (e.g. atmospheric density, landing site conditions) make such missions as challenging as they are interesting. We conducted, and periodically update, a systemlevel failure modes, effects and criticality analysis that has identified areas which needed improved designs and/or more attention to reduce mission risk. We implemented a major test program for each of the elements of EDL using full scale and appropriately scaled hardware and test conditions. We tied these tests together with a sophisticated set of analyses. However, a full up, end-to-end test (i.e., starting with a high altitude parachute deploy going all the way to landing) was not attempted due to the very high cost and limited value given the problems in testing in the Earth atmosphere and gravity.
CONCLUSION
The Mars Pathfinder mission is the embodiment of faster (3 years from project start to launch), better (3 spacecraft in one: cruise, entry and lander plus a rover) and cheaper ($171M vs >$3,OOOM for Viking).
In order to be successfbl within the constraints of this mission, Mars Pathfinder has had to develop and implement a design that inherently takes risk without sigruficantly increasing the likelihood of fidure. In order to do this we have had to do many things differently from missions in tlhe recent past.
The key to success so Car has been the exceptional personal connmitment of the entire Mars Pathfinder teann, including JPL, contractors and other NASA center members, especially the lead engineers and technical managers.
The hours are long and the pressure is high but there are great personal rewards in doing this type of challenging mission. The key is the quality and quantity of talented, energetic and motivated people. 
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